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WHETHER YOU “LIKE” IT OR NOT: THE 
INCLUSION OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES AND HOW 
COURTS CAN EFFECTIVELY CONTROL IT 
Abstract: The increasing use of social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, 
and Myspace in social interactions has led to a corresponding increase in 
the use of social media evidence in litigation. Social media sites provide 
attorneys with easily accessible, up-to-date information about individuals, 
making such sites highly desirable sources of evidence. Although recent 
case law indicates that social media evidence is largely discoverable and 
often admissible, allowing broad discovery of social media evidence in 
sexual harassment cases could be highly problematic for plaintiffs be-
cause it often produces irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that only 
serves to embarrass plaintiffs and dissuade them from pursuing otherwise 
meritorious claims. This Note examines the impact of social media dis-
covery and admission on plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases. It argues 
that in order to prevent the production of irrelevant and prejudicial so-
cial media evidence in sexual harassment cases, courts should apply the 
principles of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to the discovery phase and 
conduct an in camera review of social media evidence before allowing the 
defense to view it. 
Introduction 
 A company’s in-house counsel learns of a potential sexual harass-
ment claim by a female employee against her supervisor and believes 
the supervisor’s alleged actions raise liability concerns for the com-
pany.1 Within seconds, counsel finds the employee’s Facebook profile 
through a simple Internet search.2 The employee is a beautiful young 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2012) (describing employer liability for the harassing con-
duct of its employees). 
2 See Phillip Fung, Public Search Listings on Facebook, Facebook Blog (Sept. 5, 2007, 3:57 
AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=2963412130 (stating that limited versions 
of Facebook profiles—including a thumbnail of the user’s Facebook profile picture—will 
be available via Google, Yahoo, and other search engines to people who are not logged 
into Facebook); infra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining that many users do not 
understand their privacy options on social media sites, and as a result attorneys can often 
practice “informal discovery” by browsing social media themselves prior to the beginning 
of the case). 
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girl, and her profile picture shows her in a short, form-fitting dress, 
making what the in-house counsel considers to be a seductive face.3 
“She doesn’t look like a girl who would be offended by this supervisor’s 
conduct,” the attorney thinks.4 With the insight gained from the em-
ployee’s Facebook page, the in-house attorney begins to dismantle the 
sexual harassment claim before it is even filed.5 
 If a picture is worth a thousand words, then a social media profile 
is priceless in litigation.6 Social media, also known as social networking, 
describes any type of social interaction using technology with some 
combination of words, photographs, video, or audio.7 Social media 
sites constitute one of the most commonly used forms of electronic 
communication worldwide, exceeding even email usage in 2009.8 A 
2012 Nielson Company social media survey found that people spend 
more time on social networking sites than any other category of sites, 
dedicating 20 percent of their time on their personal computer and 30 
percent of their time on their mobile device to social media.9 The in-
                                                                                                                      
 
3 See Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare: A Procedural Rule That Cannot Adequately Pro-
tect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs from Embarrassing Exposure, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 125, 158–59 
(1998) (noting the role that gender bias plays in evaluating a plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
claim); infra note 138 and accompanying text (noting that in order to meet certain social 
norms, Facebook profile pictures most often depict users as attractive, fun-loving, humor-
ous, or in a successful romantic relationship). 
4 See Theresa M. Beiner, Sexy Dressing Revisited: Does Target Dress Play a Part in Sexual 
Harassment Cases?, 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 125, 132 (2007) (introducing the ways 
that defendants provide evidence of plaintiffs’ behavior to prove they welcomed the alleg-
edly harassing conduct); Curcio, supra note 3, at 165 (describing the stereotypical view 
commonly held by lawyers and judges that women who dress in a certain way invite har-
assment, causing them to ignore all the other reasons why a woman might want to appear 
attractive); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (determining that 
evidence of the plaintiff’s sexually provocative speech and dress were “obviously relevant” 
to determining whether sexual advances toward her were unwelcome). 
5 See Lawrence Morales II, Social Media Evidence: “What You Post or Tweet Can and Will Be 
Used Against You in A Court of Law,” 60 Advoc. 32, 32 (2012) (explaining that social media 
evidence can be used to reveal someone’s true personality or everyday behavior); infra 
notes 12–18 and accompanying text (explaining the value of social media evidence in liti-
gation). 
6 See Morales, supra note 5, at 32. 
7 Aviva Orenstein, Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords, 31 
Miss. C. L. Rev. 185, 187 n.1 (2012) (citing John G. Browning, The Lawyer’s Guide to 
Social Networking: Understanding Social Media’s Impact on the Law 17 (2010)). 
8 Breanne M. Democko, Comment, Social Media and the Rules on Authentication, 43 U. 
Tol. L. Rev. 367, 367 (2012); see Nielson Co., Global Faces and Networked Places: A 
Nielson Report on Social Networking’s New Global Footprint 1 (2009), available at 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/nielsen_globalfaces_ 
mar09.pdf. 
9 See Nielsen Co., State of the Media: The Social Media Report 4 (2012) [herein-
after The Social Media Report] (stating the amount of time consumers spend on social 
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creased and multi-faceted use of social media has dramatically altered 
the way people share information and interact with one another in 
both personal and professional settings.10 Facebook, Twitter, and 
Myspace— three of the most visited social media sites—allow users to 
post photographs and status updates, share interests, invite others to 
attend events and join social groups, and send private messages to 
the
this easily accessible, up-to-date, and desirable information available on 
                                                                                                                     
o r users.11 
 As a consequence of its popularity and omnipresence, social media 
is now one of the most sought-after sources of evidence in litigation 
worldwide.12 Attorneys in a variety of legal disciplines seek the use of 
 
media sites on their phones and personal computers); Newsroom Key Facts, Facebook, 
http://newsroom.fb.com/key-facts (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (stating that Facebook has 
one billion monthly active users as of December 2012 and 618 million daily users in De-
cember 2012). 
10 Democko, supra note 8, at 368. 
11 The Social Media Report, supra note 9, at 7; see Democko, supra note 8, at 375–78 
(describing Myspace, Facebook, and Twitter); About Twitter, Twitter, http://www.twitter. 
com/About (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); Facebook, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
facebook (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); Press Room, Myspace, http://www.myspace.com/ 
pressroom/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). A “status update” is generally a short, simple 
statement posted publically by the user that appears on her profile and in Facebook’s News 
Feed. See Cory Janssen, Facebook Status, Techopedia, http://www.techopedia.com/defini- 
tion/15442/facebook-status (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). A “message” is privately sent to 
another user, more similar to traditional email. See Help Center: Messaging, Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). In 2012, 
the top ten most-visited social media sites were: Facebook, Blogger, Twitter, Wordpress, 
LinkedIn, Pinterest, Google+, Tumblr, Myspace, and Wikia. The Social Media Report, 
supra note 9, at 7; see Democko, supra note 8, at 367 (noting Myspace, Facebook, and Twit-
ter specifically as popular social media sites); Morales, supra note 5, at 32 (describing Fa-
cebook and Twitter as the “major players” of social media). This Note focuses only on Fa-
cebook, Myspace, and Twitter because of their popularity and similarity in content and 
structure. 
12 Morales, supra note 5, at 32 (describing social media sites as a “treasure trove” of in-
formation); Orenstein, supra note 7, at 191–92; see Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social 
Media Discovery?, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 7, 7 (2012) (stating that social media has become part of 
mainstream discovery practice). A 2011 study showed that Americans spend more time on 
Facebook than any other website. Democko, supra note 8, at 367. As of 2012, 15 percent of 
adults use Twitter, with more than half of them using Twitter on a daily basis. Aaron 
Smith & Joanna Brenner, Pew Research Ctr., Twitter Use 2012, at 2 (2012). Courts 
outside the United States have led the way in using social media in litigation. Claire M. 
Specht, Note, Text Message Service of Process—No LOL Matter: Does Text Message Service of Proc-
ess Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1929, 1929–30 (2012) (explaining modern 
uses of social media in litigation worldwide). For example, in 2008, the Australian Capital 
Territory Supreme Court was the first court to allow service of a default judgment via a 
message on the defendants’ Facebook profiles. Id. In 2009, the United Kingdom allowed 
the service of an injunction on Twitter. Id. 
1844 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1841 
popular social media sites to bolster their cases.13 For example, many 
individuals are unusually honest on social media sites, and often post 
pictures and comments about illegal or provocative activities that can 
be used to undermine their credibility in litigation.14 Parties may post 
information or pictures that contradict their claims.15 Social media sites 
also record interactions with others over time, which may help plaintiffs 
prove allegations of stalking, cyberbullying, or harassment.16 Addition-
ally, because many social media users either choose to keep their pro-
files public, or do not fully understand their privacy options, attorneys 
are able to easily access this attractive evidence simply by browsing the 
sites.17 For each of these reasons, attorneys are now regularly seeking 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on Facebook? 
Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 Ill. B.J. 366, 366–67 (2010); John G. 
Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from Social Media Sites, 14 
SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 465, 465–67 (2011) (stating that social media sites provide an 
“abundance” of photographs and statements); Morales, supra note 5, at 32; Specht, supra 
note 12, at 1929–31. 
14 Boggs & Edwards, supra note 13, at 367. 
15 Id.; see Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d, 650, 653. (Sup. Ct. 2010). In Romano 
v. Steelcase, a personal injury case, the Supreme Court of New York for Suffolk County al-
lowed discovery of the plaintiff’s full Facebook and Myspace accounts—including histori-
cal records and information designated as “private” —because the publically viewable por-
tion of her accounts revealed an active lifestyle she claimed she no longer enjoyed. Id. at 
653–54. The information on her profile contradicted her statements that her injuries were 
sufficiently serious to prevent her from doing physical activity. Id. 
16 See Orenstein, supra note 7, at 192–93 (suggesting social media evidence could show 
that a witness was stalked). 
17 See Browning, supra note 13, at 471. Although easy access to social media sites makes 
informal discovery an option, practitioners should note that ethical concerns remain about 
this method and other methods of gaining access to social media. See id. at 469; Boggs & Ed-
wards, supra note 13, at 369; Browning, supra note 13, at 469. Social media sites offer users an 
opportunity to choose what information is public and private in order to personalize their 
social media experience. Democko, supra note 8, at 375–78 (describing the privacy policies 
for Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter). Public information is available to anyone, even to peo-
ple without an account on the site; what constitutes private information depends on each 
site’s own privacy standards. See About Public and Protected Tweets, Twitter, https://support. 
twitter.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) 
(stating that “public” tweets are “visible to anyone, whether or not they have a Twitter ac-
count”); How Do I Edit My Profile?, Ask Myspace, https://www.askmyspace.com/t5/Your-
Profile/How-do-I-Edit-my-Profile/ba-p/987 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (stating that unless a 
Myspace profile is marked as “restricted,” “[it] can be viewed by anyone on Myspace and 
throughout the web”); Privacy Settings and Regulations, Ask Myspace, https://www.askmy 
space.com/t5/Privacy-Abuse/Privacy-Settings-amp-Regulations/ba-p/1009 (last visited Sept. 
20, 2013) (stating that if a Myspace profile is marked as “public,” “anyone can view [it]”); 
What Does “Public” Mean?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/203805466323736/ 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (explaining that “public” includes “people who are not your 
friends [on Facebook] and people off of Facebook”). 
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discovery of social media information from both the parties and the 
social media sites themselves.18 
 Though social media may provide valuable evidence in some cases, 
social media evidence presents two specific problems for plaintiffs in 
sexual harassment cases.19 First, as social media users develop online 
personas and employees increasingly communicate via social media 
platforms, the line between a user’s private behavior and his or her pro-
fessional life becomes increasingly blurred.20 In sexual harassment cas-
es, this blurring may cause courts to admit social media evidence to 
show the plaintiff’s appearance and actions “at work,” even though 
such evidence might be irrelevant to a sexual harassment claim.21 Sec-
ond, allowing broad discovery of social media evidence might discour-
age potential plaintiffs from bringing claims because the social media 
evidence may be revealed to the defendant during the discovery phase 
of litigation.22 Although courts have begun to develop methods for util-
izing social media evidence, no court has yet identified a comprehen-
sive approach to solve these problems.23 
 This Note proposes a two-step process to stringently review social 
media evidence to determine its true relevancy to the particular sexual 
harassment case, and to prevent plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases 
from facing undue embarrassment.24 Under this process, courts should 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Browning, supra note 13, at 465, 467 (stating that lawyers in all areas of legal 
practice are attempting to discover social media information); Jonathan E. DeMay, The 
Implications of the Social Media Revolution on Discovery in U.S. Litigation, Brief, Summer 2011, 
at 62–63 (suggesting that attorneys seek discovery of social media information directly 
from plaintiffs in order to get the best results); Gensler, supra note 12, at 8 (noting the 
widespread discussion of social media discoverability). 
19 See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
20 See Patrick Lane, A Sense of Place: Geography Matters as Much as Ever, Despite the Digital 
Revolution, says Patrick Lane, Economist, Oct. 27, 2012, at 1–2, available at http://www. 
economist.com/sites/default/files/20121027_technology_and_geography.pdf. (explaining 
the increased connection of employees to their workplace due to social media). As of 
2012, 51 percent of adults age twenty-five to thirty-four use social media while at work. The 
Social Media Report, supra note 9, at 11. 
21 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (stating that courts must consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances in which the alleged harassment occurred); infra notes 95–104 and accompa-
nying text (explaining why this information may be irrelevant in sexual harassment cases). 
22 See generally Curcio, supra note 3 (explaining how allowing broad discovery may pro-
vide ultimately inadmissible information but may still embarrass the plaintiff so much that 
she chooses not to pursue a claim); infra notes 152–175 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the problem of embarrassment during discovery for sexual harassment plaintiffs). 
23 See infra notes 183–200 and accompanying text (identifying two court decisions that 
propose partial solutions to the discovery problem of social media evidence for sexual 
harassment plaintiffs). 
24 See infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text. 
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first limit the discovery of social media content by explicitly applying 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412’s admissibility principles to discovery.25 
After limiting evidence in this way, courts should then perform an in 
camera review of social media evidence to screen out irrelevant and 
prejudicial evidence prior to providing the evidence to the defen-
dant.26 This two-step judicial action will not only lessen the existing 
vulnerability of sexual harassment plaintiffs during discovery but will 
also prevent courts from admitting irrelevant evidence simply because 
of its accessibility.27 This Note also recognizes, however, that the success 
of this approach turns, in part, on increasing the familiarity of judges 
with social media and the social norms embedded therein.28 
                                                                                                                     
 This Note examines the current use of social media in litigation, 
and its impact on plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases specifically.29 
Part I first explains current sexual harassment law in the United 
States.30 Next, it examines the discoverability of social media evidence 
and its impact on civil litigation.31 Part I concludes with a discussion of 
the admissibility of social media evidence.32 Part II then examines the 
impact of the discoverability and admissibility of social media evidence 
in sexual harassment cases specifically.33 In particular, it focuses on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and its application to social media evi-
dence in sexual harassment cases.34 Finally, Part III argues that courts 
must practice consistent, limiting judicial action and strive to under-
stand social media and the social norms associated with it in order to 
limit the discovery of social media evidence and better protect sexual 
harassment plaintiffs.35 
 
25 See Fed. R. Evid. 412 (providing that evidence offered to prove a plaintiff’s sexual 
behavior or sexual predisposition is inadmissible in cases involving sexual misconduct); 
infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text. An “in camera” review is a trial 
judge’s private consideration of evidence outside of the courtroom or out of the view of 
any spectators. Black’s Law Dictionary 828 (9th ed. 2009). 
27 See infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 222–229 and accompanying text 
29 See infra notes 36–229 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 39–54 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 55–83 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 119–175 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 125–151 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 176–229 and accompanying text. 
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I. Sexual Harassment Then and Now: The Developing 
Relationship Between Sexual Harassment Law  
and Social Media 
 Section A of this Part explains the existing standards for establish-
ing a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.36 Section B 
then examines the current discoverability of social media content in 
civil litigation.37 Finally, Section C discusses the admissibility of social 
media content.38 
A. The Passage of Title VII and the Birth of “Hostile Work Environment” 
Sexual Harassment Claims 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the primary federal anti-
discrimination statute and the first federal statute to prohibit discrimi-
nation in the workplace.39 Although Title VII prohibits discrimination 
“because of . . . sex,” sexual harassment was not prohibited until 1980 
when it was identified in the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC) Guidelines on Discrimination Based on Sex 
(“EEOC Guidelines”).40 The EEOC Guidelines, which apply to all em-
ployers with fifteen or more employees, established that harassment in 
the workplace “on the basis of sex” constitutes a form of discrimination 
that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 
                                                                                                                      
36 See infra notes 39–54 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 55–83 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text. 
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the 
Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 379 (2002). Title 
VII prohibits discrimination by employers or labor unions in hiring, discharge, compensa-
tion, and other terms and conditions of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII 
also prohibits facially neutral employment practices that disproportionately negatively 
impact a protected class. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971); Befort, 
supra note 39, at 379. 
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657–58 (D.D.C. 1976) 
(finding a violation of Title VII when “the conduct of the plaintiff’s supervisor [in response 
to plaintiff’s denial of the supervisor’s sexual advances] created an artificial barrier to em-
ployment which was placed before one gender and not the other”); 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (2012); 
Glendora C. Hughes, Sexual Harassment: Then and Now, 33 Md. B.J., May–June 2000, at 27 
(identifying the first case in which sexual harassment was identified as a violation of Title VII 
in 1976); About EEOC, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (describing the role of the EEOC). 
41 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (de-
fining an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person”). 
1848 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1841 
 The EEOC Guidelines describe two types of actionable sexual har-
assment claims: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.42 The two 
types of claims offer different ways for a plaintiff to prevail on her har-
assment claim.43 A hostile work environment claim, unlike a quid pro 
quo claim, allows a plaintiff to prevail without proving that a tangible 
employment action—such as a firing or demotion—occurred as a re-
sult of her refusal of sexual advances.44 Rather, the success of a hostile 
work environment claim turns on the plaintiff proving that unwelcome 
sexual conduct is so severe or pervasive that it unreasonably interferes 
                                                                                                                      
42 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. This Note will focus on hostile work environment claims (here-
inafter “sexual harassment cases”), rather than quid pro quo claims. A plaintiff may bring a 
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when a supervisor with authority over her makes 
submission to or rejection of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or 
other verbal or physical sexual conduct a “term or condition” of the plaintiff’s employ-
ment. Id.; Elsie Mata, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment 
Claims: Changing the Legal Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether Challenged Conduct Is 
Unwelcome, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 791, 802 (2001). An explicit condition of employment 
might be “I will fire you if you don’t have sex with me.” Mata, supra, at 802. An implicit 
condition of employment might be a supervisor mentioning sexual favors while discussing 
promotion with a lower level employee. Id.; see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512–13 (9th 
Cir. 1994). Even if an employer is unaware of the harassing conduct, an employer will be 
liable for any of its supervisor’s harassing actions in a quid pro quo claim unless the em-
ployer can prove that it took immediate steps to correct the harassing behavior. Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998) (noting that employer liability is logical when 
harassment has tangible results, such as hiring, firing, promotion, or changes in compen-
sation or work assignment); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–71 (noting that courts have consistently 
held employers liable for actions of supervisors “whether or not the employer knew, 
should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). 
43 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11; Mata, supra note 42, at 809. Both men and women can be vic-
tims of sexual harassment and both men and women can sexually harass members of either 
or both genders. Mata, supra note 42, at 793 n.10. For convenience and because sexual har-
assment is almost exclusively practiced by men against women, this Note will use the pronoun 
“he” when referring to the alleged harasser and “she” when referring to the plaintiff. Id.; see 
Enforcement & Litigations Statistics, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment.cfm (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) 
(showing that only 16.3 percent of all sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC or Fair 
Employment Practices agencies nationwide in fiscal year 2011 were filed by males); Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. (Aug. 1, 2000), http://www.nwlc.org/ 
resource/sexual-harassment-workplace (citing a survey showing that almost half of all work-
ing women have experienced some form of harassment on the job). Throughout this Note, I 
will refer to persons subjected to sexual harassment as “plaintiffs.” Although not every victim 
of sexual harassment becomes a plaintiff in a sexual harassment claim, the use of the term is 
meant to prevent the negative connotation that comes with the term “victim.” See Beiner, 
supra note 4, at 125 n.4. 
44 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Actions that qualify as “tangible employment actions” for the 
purposes of a quid pro quo claim include “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
2013] Sexual Harassment and Social Media Evidence 1849 
with her work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.45 
 The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a hostile work environ-
ment claim under Title VII in its 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson.46 Through Meritor and two subsequent sexual harassment cases, 
the Court established the elements of a hostile work environment 
claim.47 First, the Court determined that for the harassing conduct to 
be sufficiently severe and pervasive, conduct must be such that a rea-
sonable person would objectively find it abusive, and the plaintiff her-
self subjectively found it so abusive as to create a hostile work environ-
ment. 48 Although no bright-line test exists for determining whether 
conduct is severe or pervasive, the Court suggested relevant factors to 
consider when evaluating the conduct objectively, including: the fre-
quency of the conduct; the severity of the conduct; whether the con-
duct was physically threatening or humiliating; the social context, at-
mosphere, and attitudes of the workplace in which the harassment 
occurred; and, whether it unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s 
ability to work.49 Whereas these factors suggest sexual harassment, 
“mere offensive utterances” and the “innocuous differences in the ways 
men and women routinely interact” such as teasing and isolated com-
ments do not rise to the level of actionable harassment.50 
 Second, the Court held that courts must consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” in which the conduct occurred to determine whether 
the sexual advances were unwelcome by the plaintiff.51 The totality of 
the circumstances includes the nature of the sexual advances, the con-
text in which the conduct occurred, and the plaintiff’s words, actions, 
                                                                                                                      
45 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)(1985)); id. at 67. 
46 Id. at 66–67. 
47 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998); Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
48 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60, 67; see Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith 
B. Tracy, Hidden in Plain Sight: Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Cases by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 
247, 252 (2008) (stating that the Court “refined the standard for establishing a hostile 
work environment” by establishing that the offensive conduct must be both objectively and 
subjectively hostile or abusive). The plaintiff in Meritor believed she had to tolerate her 
supervisor’s sexual advances in order to keep her job, which the Court determined made 
the harassment a condition of her employment. 477 U.S. at 60. 
49 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–23. 
50 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
51 Meritor, 477 U.S at 68–69 (stating that courts must consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances in which the alleged harassment occurred and that “[t]he correct inquiry is 
whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were un-
welcome”). 
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and appearance in the workplace.52 The Court explicitly stated that 
evidence of the plaintiff’s dress and “personal fantasies” are “obviously 
relevant” to determining whether conduct is unwelcome.53 If the objec-
tive and subjective prongs are satisfied, the plaintiff has established a 
cause of action for a hostile work environment claim.54 
B. What Happens Online Does Not Stay Online:  
The Discovery of Social Media Evidence 
 Although the law governing social media discovery is still develop-
ing, recent case law shows that social media information is generally 
discoverable.55 For its clear reasoning, interpretation of precedent, and 
broad applicability, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana’s 2010 decision in E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Manage-
ment, LLC, has been the model used by other courts as they grapple 
with similar questions regarding social media evidence.56 Additionally, 
in sexual harassment cases specifically, courts have supported the 2007 
holding of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada in Mackel-
prang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc. that social media 
communications with non-parties have limited or no relevance in sex-
ual harassment cases.57 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado’s 2012 decision in E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham 
Co. of Georgia balanced the broad discoverability allowed in Simply Stor-
age with the limit established in Mackelprang.58 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 69. 
53 Id. at 68–69. 
54 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65–67; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2012). 
55 See Kathryn R. Brown, Note, The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychol-
ogy of Social Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs, 14 
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 357, 368 (2012); infra notes 56–83 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing recent cases on the issue of social media discovery). 
56 270 F.R.D. 430, 432, 436–37 (S.D. Ind. 2010); see, e.g., Mailhoit v. Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570–71 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Simply Storage when determin-
ing the relevant scope of discovery for social media information); Robinson v. Jones Lang 
LaSalle Americas, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00127-PK, 2012 WL 3763545, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 
2012) (describing Simply Storage as the “most frequently cited and well-reasoned” case on 
social media discovery); id. at *3 n.4 (noting that treatises and law reviews have discussed 
Simply Storage as the benchmark on social media discovery); Holter v. Wells Fargo & Co., 
281 F.R.D. 340, 344 (D. Minn. 2011) (adopting the reasoning in Simply Storage). 
57 No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007); Brown-
ing, supra note 13, at 474 (describing the Mackelprang decision as “particularly illuminat-
ing” to the issue of social media discovery); see E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. 
of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012). 
58 See 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3; Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 435–37; Mackelprang, 2007 
WL 119149, at *6–8. 
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1. Social Media Content Is Broadly Discoverable 
 In Simply Storage, a sexual harassment case, the defendants sought 
discovery of complete copies of the plaintiffs’ Facebook and Myspace 
profiles, including all photographs, videos, status updates, messages, 
and any other changes to the profiles during the relevant time pe-
riod.59 The defendants argued that this social media content would 
provide relevant insight into the cause of the plaintiffs’ emotional 
harm, which the EEOC, acting on behalf of the plaintiffs, alleged was 
due to the defendants’ harassment.60 The EEOC refused to produce 
this information, describing it as “overbroad, not relevant, [and] un-
duly burdensome,” claiming that it invaded the plaintiffs’ privacy, and 
asserting that it would harass or embarrass them.61 
                                                                                                                     
 Ruling on the general discoverability of social media content, the 
court determined that although social media presents a new context for 
its application, the basic principles of discovery embodied in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 still apply to social media evidence.62 Rule 26 
provides a broad discovery standard that allows discovery of all material 
 
59 270 F.R.D. at 432. A Facebook or Myspace profile typically consists of a picture of the 
user (“profile picture”) and information about her, typically including her age, occupa-
tion, relationship status, and interests. See How Do I Edit My Profile?, Ask Myspace, supra 
note 17 (describing the information that can be included in a Myspace profile); Update 
Your Basic Info, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/334656726616576/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 13, 2013) (providing information about what constitutes “basic information” on 
a Facebook Profile). The defendants in Simply Storage specifically sought “all photographs 
or videos posted by [plaintiffs] or anyone on their behalf on Facebook or MySpace” during 
a specified time period; and electronic or hard copies of the plaintiffs’ “complete pro-
file[s] on Facebook and MySpace (including all updates, changes, or modifications to 
[plaintiffs’] profile[s]) and all status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs, comments, and applications.” 
Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 432. In regard to applications, the requests specifically sought 
information from applications “including, but not limited to, ‘How well do you know me’ 
and the ‘Naughty Application.’” Id. Specifically identifying these applications, which seem 
to be about the plaintiff’s personality and social interactions, implies that the defense was 
seeking to create a particular image of the plaintiff and raises concerns about social media 
photos and information being used in a similar way to a plaintiff’s dress being used in rape 
and sexual harassment cases. See Beiner, supra note 4, at 126 (explaining concern about 
the bias that dress continues to create for juries in rape cases and how one would expect a 
similar result in sexual harassment cases). 
60 Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 432–33 (explaining that the EEOC claimed the harass-
ment increased the plaintiffs’ anxiety and caused depression). The EEOC has the author-
ity both to investigate charges of discrimination against employers and, if it finds discrimi-
nation has occurred, to attempt to settle or file a lawsuit. See About EEOC, supra note 40. 
61 Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 432. 
62 Id. at 433–36 (establishing general discoverability principles for social media infor-
mation); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
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relevant to the claim or material capable of producing relevant and ad-
missible information.63 
 The court further concluded that social media information is not 
barred from discovery solely because the user labeled it “private” on 
the site, and therefore must be produced if relevant to a claim or de-
fense.64 Nonetheless, due to the sheer volume of information available 
on social media sites, courts first must evaluate the substance of social 
media communications to somewhat limit the amount of content pro-
duced.65 
 Therefore, the Simply Storage court allowed discovery of the plain-
tiffs’ social media profiles, postings, messages, applications, third-party 
communications, and photographs posted on the social media site dur-
ing the relevant time period of the claim.66 The court explained that 
this information was relevant and discoverable because one could rea-
sonably expect it to contain evidence of the plaintiffs’ claimed emo-
tional distress.67 The court instructed the EEOC to err on the side of 
production if relevance was in question, but also noted that the EEOC 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(1) provides the general rule for the scope of 
discovery and allows parties to discover “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense. . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 
Id. Rule 26(b)(2)(c) provides a list of reasons for which the court may limit discovery re-
quests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c). 
64 Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 434 (finding that although privacy concerns are often inte-
gral to determining whether a request for discovery is unduly burdensome, “a person’s ex-
pectation and intent that her [social media] communications be maintained as private is not 
a legitimate basis for shielding those communications from discovery”); see also Romano, 907 
N.Y.S.2d at 653–54 (finding the plaintiff’s privacy argument unpersuasive because both Face-
book and Myspace describe themselves as ways to share information with others and allow 
users to control the information they share with others). 
65 Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 435 (noting that although most social media communi-
cation would reflect a plaintiff’s mental and emotional state, that is “hardly justification for 
requiring the production of every thought she may have reduced to writing” (quoting 
Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936( JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
66 Id. at 436. 
67 Id. The court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the only relevant communications 
were those that specifically referenced matters alleged in the complaint, recognizing that 
such a narrow scope would likely fail to include pertinent information and provide an 
inaccurate picture of the cause and intensity of the alleged emotional injuries. Id. at 435–
36 (noting that plaintiffs would likely exclude routine non-events from their social media 
profiles that might indicate the supervisor’s behavior was typically appropriate and not the 
cause of their emotional distress). 
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could still object to the admissibility of the discovered social media evi-
dence at trial.68 
2. Limiting Discovery of Non-Party Social Media Communications in 
Sexual Harassment Cases 
 In contrast to the Simply Storage court, which concluded that social 
media evidence was broadly discoverable, the Mackelprang court lim-
ited the discovery of evidence of social media communications with 
non-parties.69 There, the defendants sought discovery of the plaintiff’s 
Myspace messages with third parties that they claimed would show that 
the plaintiff willingly engaged in and actively encouraged her supervi-
sor’s alleged sexual communications and that the supervisor’s conduct 
did not offend or emotionally harm her.70 
 The Mackelprang court recognized the potentially prejudicial im-
pact of social media content.71 Explicitly applying the principles of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 412, which bars admitting evidence of the plain-
tiff’s sexual conduct in particular cases, the Mackelprang court limited 
discovery of the plaintiff’s private Myspace messages to those that con-
tained information specifically regarding her sexual harassment claim 
or her alleged emotional distress.72 Other unrelated but sexually pro-
vocative messages with third parties, however, were found irrelevant, 
nondiscoverable, and inadmissible because a plaintiff’s enjoyment of 
certain sexual activity in her private life does not prevent her from find-
ing the same conduct offensive when it comes from a fellow employee 
or a supervisor.73 The court instructed defense counsel that information 
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. at 436–37. Unless otherwise specified, this Note’s references to “social media evi-
dence” refer to pictures, posts, status updates, and messages on Facebook, Twitter, or 
Myspace. 
69 See Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 436 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *6. 
70 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *3. 
71 Id. at *6–8; see Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 435 (describing the Mackelprang court’s 
decision); Browning, supra note 13, at 475 (noting that the Mackelprang decision was par-
ticularly helpful in determining what social media evidence is relevant); Brown, supra note 
55, at 359–60 (discussing ways in which social media evidence could be prejudicial). 
72 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *6–8 (explaining how courts applying Rule 412 
have limited evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct and ordering limited discovery); see 
Fed. R. Evid. 412 (excluding evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual behavior or predisposition); 
infra notes 125–151 and accompanying text (describing Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and 
its application in sexual harassment cases). 
73 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *6–8 (“The courts applying Rule 412 have declined 
to recognize a sufficiently relevant connection between a plaintiff’s non-work related sex-
ual activity and the allegation that he or she was subjected to unwelcome and offensive 
sexual advancements in the workplace.”). 
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from the Myspace account could be properly obtained only through 
narrow requests for production in order to avoid production of infor-
mation that would ultimately prove inadmissible under Rule 412.74 
 Though utilizing a different process, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colorado applied similar reasoning when limiting discovery 
of social media information in Honeybaked Ham.75 There, the court al-
lowed discovery of the plaintiffs’ full, unredacted social media informa-
tion to combat claims that the plaintiffs suffered emotional harm due 
to the defendant’s sexual harassment.76 Explicitly acknowledging that it 
was not ruling as to admissibility, the court ordered production of each 
of the plaintiffs’ social media, specifically noting the potential relevance 
of photographs and text that provided insight into the plaintiffs’ sexual 
activities, emotional state, and financial expectations related to the law-
suit.77 
 Acknowledging the tenuous relevancy of certain evidence, how-
ever, the Honeybaked Ham court devised a process that reflects the bal-
ancing of the broad discoverability allowed in Simply Storage with the 
limit established in Mackelprang.78 To weed out irrelevant information 
from discovered social media content, the court ordered the parties to 
provide access to their social media accounts directly to the court.79 
The court agreed to review the content in camera and then provide 
only the legally relevant social media information to the EEOC.80 The 
court allowed the EEOC to exclude any privileged content from the 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. at *6–7 (discussing Rule 412 and explaining that discovery must be limited to 
prevent the defense from obtaining “irrelevant information, including possibly sexually 
explicit or sexually promiscuous email communications between Plaintiff and third per-
sons, which are not relevant, admissible or discoverable”); id. at *8 (ordering defendant to 
serve narrow requests for discovery directly to the plaintiff to prevent discovery of irrele-
vant evidence). 
75 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3. 
76 Id. at *1–2. Because the plaintiffs had voluntarily shared this information with others 
on the social media sites, the court quickly dismissed any privacy concerns when allowing 
discovery. Id. at *2. 
77 Id. (finding that a photograph of the plaintiff wearing a shirt with the word “cunt” 
in large letters written across the front, statements by the plaintiff that losing a pet and 
ending a romantic relationship caused her emotional distress, statements that indicated 
the plaintiff was sexually aggressive, evidence of sexually charged communications with 
other class members, the plaintiff’s post-termination employment opportunities, and the 
plaintiff’s current financial condition were all potentially relevant for the defendant). 
78 See id. at *2–3; Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 435–37; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at 
*6–8. 
79 Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3. 
80 Id. at *3; see infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Rules of 
Evidence 401, 402, and 403, which govern relevancy determinations). 
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relevant social media information, and to object to the court’s rele-
vancy determinations.81 Then, the defendant would receive the remain-
ing, relevant information from the EEOC.82 The court determined that 
this arrangement would allow the court to balance the discovery rules 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 with the relevance rules of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.83 
C. Admissibility of Social Media Evidence and Its Impact on Discovery 
 Although the admissibility of evidence is naturally a concern at the 
time of trial, determining the admissibility of social media evidence is 
crucial even in the pre-trial discovery phase.84 Because Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26 allows discovery of information “reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” a judge must 
have a clear understanding of what evidence will ultimately be admissi-
ble to accurately determine what information should be discoverable.85 
Thus, an analysis of the admissibility of social media evidence is neces-
sary to fully understanding the vulnerability sexual harassment plain-
tiffs encounter when this evidence is discovered.86 
 To date, most courts have admitted social media evidence under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence just as they would traditional forms of 
evidence.87 Therefore, to be admissible, social media evidence must 
                                                                                                                      
81 Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *3. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *2–3. 
84 See Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996) (recog-
nizing that “Rule 412 must inform the proper scope of discovery” in a sexual harassment 
case “to preclude inquiry into areas which will clearly fail to satisfy the balancing test of 
Rule 412(b)(2)”); Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions 
Through Discretion, 51 Emory L.J. 559, 567 (2002) (explaining that vagueness in Rule 412 as 
to what information will be admissible causes confusion for judges about whether discov-
ery of certain information will lead to admissible evidence). 
85 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note (“In order 
not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412. . . . [c]ourts should presumptively issue pro-
tective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that 
the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the 
particular case . . . .”); Aiken, supra note 84, at 567, 582 (stating that courts would exclude 
more evidence as nondiscoverable if they better understood Rule 412’s bar against admit-
ting certain evidence). 
86 See Aiken, supra note 84, at 567 (noting that the vagueness of Rule 412(b)’s admissi-
bility standards contributes to “the inability of courts to know whether . . . discovery will 
lead to admissible evidence”); id. at 582 (claiming that Rule 412’s civil rule would lead to 
less confusion if it provided specific instances when the victim’s sexual conduct could be 
introduced, just as Rule 412’s criminal rule does). 
87 Boggs & Edwards, supra note 13, at 369; Brown, supra note 55, at 379; Morales, supra 
note 5, at 32. 
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meet the three essential requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
it must be relevant, authentic, and not subject to an exclusionary 
rule.88 Despite initial concerns, there is growing acceptance among at-
torneys and courts that social media evidence generally satisfies these 
standards, presents very few new challenges, and may be admitted as 
often as similar evidence in a traditional form.89 
                                                                                                                     
1. If It’s Not on Facebook, It Probably Never Happened: The Inherent 
Relevancy of Social Media Evidence in Modern Litigation 
 Due to its ubiquitous use, it is clear that social media evidence will 
often satisfy the relevancy test of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence because it can make a fact of consequence in the case more or 
less probable than the fact would be without the evidence.90 With mil-
 
88 See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (stating the test for relevancy); Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating the 
general admissibility of relevant evidence); Fed. R. Evid. 901 (requiring that evidence is 
authentic); see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Fed. R. Evid. 412; Morales, supra note 5, at 32. 
89 See Josh Gilliland, iWitness: The Admissibility of Social Media Evidence, Litig., Winter 2013, 
at 20–21. One initial admissibility concern was that all social media evidence would be con-
sidered inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 because all posts and mes-
sages on social media sites are categorically out-of-court statements. See Fed. R. Evid 801; 
Morales, supra note 5, at 42; Orenstein, supra note 7, at 194. Nevertheless, because much 
social media content introduced in court will be used for the reasons explicitly identified as 
exceptions in Rule 803, such as to refresh a witness’s memory or to prove a statement was 
uttered, social media evidence generally will not be excluded as hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 
803; Gilliland, supra, at 21 (describing how social media evidence might fit into the hearsay 
exceptions); Orenstein, supra note 7, at 194–202 (describing the numerous exceptions to 
hearsay and the tendency of social media evidence to fit within them). Courts also initially 
struggled to apply Rule 901’s authentication requirement to social media evidence due to an 
inherent distrust of Internet content. See Fed. R. Evid 901; Orenstein, supra note 7, at 207. 
Social media evidence is particularly difficult to authenticate because it is constantly updated, 
fake profiles are easily created, and hacking of profiles is fairly common. See Morales, supra 
note 5, at 36 (noting that many people post on Facebook about every aspect of their daily 
routine, sharing over 30 billion pieces of content each month); Hacked Accounts, Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/467703053240859/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). Though 
courts initially varied in their approaches to authentication, many courts now recognize that 
the methods used for authenticating traditional forms of evidence provide sufficient guide-
lines for ways to authenticate social media evidence. Morales, supra note 5, at 43 (explaining 
that though authentication is more difficult than other admissibility issues for social media 
evidence, generally traditional evidentiary principles may be used to determine its admissibil-
ity); Orenstein, supra note 7, at 207–08, 224 (noting that many courts have adopted a liberal 
approach to authentication due to concerns that a limiting admissibility standard will ex-
clude critical evidence). 
90 See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 402; ; Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s 
note; Morales, supra note 5, at 33 (“Social media evidence may be relevant to nearly every 
type of legal dispute primarily because, with 901 million people using just Facebook, there 
is a strong likelihood that the litigants in every case have social media profiles.”); infra 
notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
2013] Sexual Harassment and Social Media Evidence 1857 
lions of people using social media every day to describe their daily rou-
tine, thoughts, and feelings, it is inevitable that parties will share infor-
mation that relates to ongoing litigation, thereby satisfying Rule 401’s 
relevance requirement.91 For example, many courts have found Twitter 
messages and Facebook posts to be relevant because they show the us-
er’s state of mind.92 
 Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows courts to 
exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, may still bar some social 
media evidence.93 For example, in Honeybaked Ham, the court implicitly 
acknowledged the limits Rule 403 imposes when it expressed doubt 
that certain discoverable social media evidence pertaining to the plain-
tiff’s character would ultimately be admissible.94 
2. Sharing More Than Courts Should See: Social Media Evidence and 
Exclusionary Rules of Evidence 404 and 412 
 Based on the wide range of content contained within social media 
evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 412 are germane to de-
                                                                                                                      
91 Morales, supra note 5, at 33; see Fed. R. Evid. 401. As of June 2013, Facebook had over 
one billion monthly active users, 699 million of whom were daily users. Newsroom: Key Facts, 
supra note 9. In January 2012, Myspace had twenty-five million unique visitors. John Cook, 
Say, What? Myspace Moves Up in Ranking of Top 50 U.S. Web Sites, GeekWire (Mar. 21, 2012, 2:02 
PM), http://www.geekwire.com/2012/Myspace-move-top-50-web-properties/. Both Face-
book and Myspace describe themselves as sites for people to meet and socialize, and both 
sites allow their users to interact with each other online. See Myspace, Myspace, https://www. 
myspace.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (inviting users to “[d]iscover, share, and connect 
with culture . . . and people”); Newsroom Key Facts, Facebook, supra note 9 (stating Facebook’s 
mission “to make the world more open and connected” and to allow users to “stay connected 
with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express 
what matters to them”). Facebook and Myspace allow users to connect through playing 
games, sharing music, recommending restaurants and more. Newsroom, Facebook, http:// 
newsroom.fb.com/platform (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); This Is Myspace, Myspace, https:// 
www.myspace.com/learnmore/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (inviting users to “connect to 
music from the world’s largest streaming library”). 
92 Christopher E. Parker & Travis B. Swearingen, “Tweet” Me Your Status: Social Media in 
Discovery and at Trial, Fed. Law., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 35; see Brown, supra note 55, at 3361 
(noting the use of social media evidence to prove a party’s emotional state). 
93 See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Morales, supra note 5, at 42 (noting that despite the value of 
social media evidence, a Rule 403 challenge could still prevent the evidence from being 
admitted). Prejudicial effects include causing jury confusion, causing undue delay, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
94 See 2012 WL 5430974, at *2 (explaining that evidence intended to show the plain-
tiff’s “positive attitude” about certain sexual behaviors might not be admissible if it were 
unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff). 
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termining social media information’s admissibility.95 Companions to 
Rule 403, Rules 404 and 412 provide specific circumstances in which 
otherwise relevant evidence should not be admitted.96 Rule 404(a) may 
bar a great deal of social media evidence in sexual harassment cases as 
the Rule prohibits the admission of evidence when its sole purpose is to 
convince the jury that a party’s past behavior makes her more likely to 
have committed the bad act at issue.97 Social media evidence may pro-
vide insight into a person’s character because photographs on social 
media sites could reveal users’ daily activities, posts could contain users’ 
unfiltered thoughts or their typical practices, and messages could pro-
vide powerful depictions of users’ beliefs or emotional state. 98 
 Equally important, social media sites provide more subtle insight 
into a user’s character.99 Facebook encourages users to “like” com-
ments made by others or pages hosted by affinity groups.100 These 
“likes” appear publically below the comment or page.101 Twitter users 
“follow” individuals, causes, groups, or celebrities, and a list of whom 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Fed. R. Evid. 404; Fed. R. Evid. 412; infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text 
(describing the type of character evidence and evidence of sexual conduct available on 
social media sites). 
96 Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note (stating that “certain circumstances call 
for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance,” and that Article IV of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence serves to “reflect the policies underlying the present rule, 
which is designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have 
been formulated”); see Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Fed. R. Evid. 412. 
97 See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Charac-
ter Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 Hastings L.J. 663, 668 (1998) (explaining that Rule 404 pro-
hibits using evidence that the accused has a violent temper or started a fight in the past to 
argue that he probably started the fight in question). Rule 404(b) allows the admission of 
character evidence to show motive, identity, knowledge, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); Morales, supra note 
5, at 41. Rule 403’s balancing test, which evaluates whether the evidence’s prejudicial ef-
fects substantially outweigh its probative value, still applies. Morales, supra note 5, at 42; see 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
98 Parker & Swearingen, supra note 92, at 34–35 (“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that a 
user’s social filter—that buffer that tells us what not to say and do at a dinner party—often 
stops working the moment a person sits down in front of a computer screen without the 
surrounding social constraints experienced in everyday life.”); see Morales, supra note 5, at 
41 (describing a Rule 404 challenge to character evidence in a criminal case); Brown, su-
pra note 55, at 373 (noting that social media evidence has been used to undermine crimi-
nal defendants’ remorse). 
99 See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (describing the ways the structure of 
social media sites provides insight into a user’s character). 
100 Like, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/like (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
101 Id. 
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they follow appears on their profile.102 Though potentially inaccurate, a 
list of a Facebook user’s likes or whom a Twitter user follows could pro-
vide a convincing description of that user’s character.103 As such, attor-
neys are increasingly seeking to undermine their opposing party by 
admitting such readily accessible, unedited, and compelling evi-
enc
f person who 
ou
d e.104 
 Similarly, though only applicable in cases involving sexual miscon-
duct, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 further limits admission of evidence 
that pertains to certain aspects of a plaintiff’s character.105 Commonly 
known as the “rape shield law,” Rule 412 prohibits the admission of evi-
dence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition or that a victim 
previously engaged in sexual behavior.106 Although it originally applied 
only in criminal rape cases and not to civil sexual harassment suits, Rule 
412 now applies to any civil or criminal case that involves alleged sexual 
misconduct.107 Previously, defendants regularly introduced evidence of 
a sexual harassment plaintiff’s sexual history and sexual conduct to 
convince the court that the plaintiff was not the kind o
w ld have found the workplace environment hostile.108 
 In 1994, however, over a decade after its original enactment, Con-
gress extended Rule 412 to civil cases after women’s advocacy groups, 
legal scholars, and some courts recognized that admitting evidence of 
plaintiffs’ past sexual conduct served only to embarrass plaintiffs and 
                                                                                                                      
102 See FAQs About Following, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-
basi
u “like” on Facebook “help friends get to know you bet-
ter”
s activities, relationships, emotions, and thoughts”); 
Ore
 affected by Federal Rule of Evidence 412). 
deral “rape shield law”). 
rior to the extension of Rule 412, in-
clud
cs/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last vis-
ited Sept. 13, 2013). 
103 See The Like Button, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/like (last visited Sept. 13, 
2013) (stating that the things yo
); FAQs About Following, supra note 102 (indicating that Twitter users follow people they 
find interesting or meaningful). 
104 See Morales, supra note 5, at 32 (stating that social media sites give lawyers access to 
“raw unfiltered evidence of a witness’
nstein, supra note 7, at 192 (explaining attorneys’ desire to gather uncensored infor-
mation from social media sites). 
105 See Fed. R. Evid. 412 (a); Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *3–4 (providing an ex-
ample of when social media evidence may be
106 Fed. R. Evid. 412(a); Beiner, supra note 4, at 126 (describing Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 as the fe
107 See Fed. R. Evid. 412; Curcio, supra note 3, at 137 (describing the extension of Rule 
412 to civil cases). 
108 Curcio, supra note 3, at 133 (providing examples of the types of evidence that 
courts admitted about a plaintiff’s sexual history p
ing evidence about pre-marital sex she had with her husband, her gynecology records, 
and evidence that she had watched X-rated films). 
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discourage women from initiating sexual harassment claims at all.109 
With the extension, Congress sought to protect plaintiffs’ privacy and 
to allow courts to focus on legitimate claims of workplace sexual har-
sm
 criminal cases, where Rule 
12 
as ent.110 
 Nevertheless, Rule 412(b)(2) contains an exception in civil cases 
that may limit the protection it offers to sexual harassment plaintiffs.111 
Specifically, Rule 412(b)(2) permits evidence of the plaintiff’s private 
sexual conduct or sexual proclivity as admissible if “its probative value 
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair 
prejudice to any party.”112 Because the Rule requires the defendant to 
“convince a court that the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs the potential harm” or any resulting prejudice to the plain-
tiff, whether certain evidence will be admitted is decided on a case-by-
case basis.113 Therefore, because individual courts decide whether evi-
dence of past sexual behavior is prejudicial or harmful, such evidence is 
admissible more often in civil cases than in
4 does not provide such an exception.114 
                                                                                                                      
109 Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note (stating the reason for the extension 
to civil cases); see Aiken, supra note 84, at 561–62 (describing the extension of Rule 412 
and the private and sometimes embarrassing personal information that was admitted prior 
to Rule 412’s extension); Curcio, supra note 3, at 126 (describing feminist scholars’ and 
activists’ dissatisfaction with Rule 412 prior to its extension to civil cases); id. at 135 (citing 
case law where courts barred discovery of evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual history based 
on an application of Rule 412); id. at 137 (stating that Congress amended Rule 412 after 
public discussion of the issues involved). 
110 Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note (explaining that Congress intended to 
protect plaintiffs against “invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereo-
typing that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion 
of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process”); Curcio, supra note 3, at 126–27 (stating 
that Congress’s goal in extending Rule 412 to civil cases was to protect plaintiffs and en-
courage victims of sexual harassment to bring meritorious claims to court). 
111 See Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2); Beiner, supra note 4, at 128–29 (describing the Rule 
412(b) extension and its effects). 
112 Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2). 
113 See id.; Beiner, supra note 4, at 129. 
114 Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2) advisory committee’s note; see Beiner, supra note 4, at 129. 
The 412(b)(2) exception requires the proponent of the evidence to justify the admission 
of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2). Although Rule 412 does not provide the same 
exception in criminal cases as it does in civil cases, Rule 412 does offer three specific ex-
ceptions in criminal cases for: (1) “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behav-
ior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, 
injury, or other physical evidence;” (2) “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual 
behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the 
defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor;” and (3) “evidence whose ex-
clusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). 
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 Although Rule 412 is an admissibility rule and therefore does not 
govern the discovery process directly, the Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Rule 412 suggests that courts limit the scope of discovery using Rule 
412’s principles.115 The Advisory Committee’s Note suggests that if a 
plaintiff seeks a protective order to bar discovery of evidence to prevent 
depicting sex-
ual behavior, or sexually explicit messages or comments each contain 
in f 
work that is
 Because sexual harassment cases involve long-held social precon-
ceptions regarding how men and women should behave, determining 
what information will lead to relevant and admissible evidence is par-
                                                                                                                     
unnecessary and embarrassing invasions into her private life, the court 
should presumptively enter such an order under the principles of Rule 
412.116 
 The Mackelprang court provided an example of how Rule 412 
could limit discovery of social media evidence.117 Based on the Mackel-
prang court’s application, courts could use Rule 412 as a guide to find 
that a Facebook user’s relationship status, photographs 
formation about the plaintiff’s personal sexual conduct outside o
 irrelevant to her sexual harassment claim.118 
II. The Special Dangers of Discovery and Admission of Social 
Media Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases 
 
115 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note; Katie M. Patton, 
Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues That Plague Sexual Harassment Suits, 57 Hastings L.J. 991, 
994–95 (2006) (describing the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 412 and the purpose of 
the rule). 
116 See  Fed. R. Evid. 412(c) advisory committee’s note; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, 
at *3–4 (citing the Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note); supra notes 69–74 and 
accompanying text (explaining the Mackelprang court’s reliance on the principles of Rule 
412 in noting that sexual conduct outside the workplace is irrelevant, nondiscoverable, 
and inadmissible). Because the discussion of discovery is limited to the Advisory Commit-
tee’s Notes, courts must apply Rule 412’s principles to discovery on a case-by-case basis. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note; Beiner, supra note 4, at 130–31. The Advisory 
Committee’s Note also explains that plaintiffs may seek protective orders under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note. Rule 26(c) 
states that: “A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protec-
tive order. . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(c). 
117 See Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *6 (explicitly applying Rule 412’s principles to 
deny discovery of the plaintiff’s allegedly sexually promiscuous Myspace emails with third 
parties and explaining that “courts applying Rule 412 have declined to recognize a suffi-
ciently relevant connection between a plaintiff’s non-work related sexual activity and the 
allegation that he or she was subjected to unwelcome and offensive sexual advancements 
in the workplace”). 
118 See Fed. R. Evid. 412; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *6. 
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ticularly complex.119 Sexual harassment cases are difficult to prove, as 
they require different evidence and varying trial strategies for each par-
ticular case based on the personalities and actions of the parties and 
the environment in which the alleged harassment occurred.120 Conse-
quently, the inclusion of social media evidence as a new form of evi-
dence will likely complicate the discovery and admissibility decisions in 
these cases even further.121 
 This Part examines the impact of social media evidence on the dis-
covery and admission of evidence in sexual harassment cases.122 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses how Federal Rule of Evidence 412 fails to 
adequately exclude irrelevant social media evidence of a plaintiff’s sex-
ual history, just as it has failed with more traditional forms of evidence 
in sexual harassment cases.123 Section B then explains why the discov-
ery process is more problematic for sexual harassment plaintiffs than 
for plaintiffs in other civil suits, and examines why broad discovery of 
social media evidence will increase those difficulties.124 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Admissibility of Social Media Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases 
 Generally, sexual harassment cases present the same evidentiary 
challenges of relevance, authentication, and overcoming exclusionary 
rules as any other case.125 But, although the elements of a hostile work 
environment claim—that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual 
conduct that was so severe or pervasive as to create an abusive or hostile 
work environment—should dictate which evidence is admitted, courts 
have struggled to define the scope of admissible evidence within these 
 
119 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 125 (acknowledging that gender myths and sexual ste-
reotypes influence the types of evidence admitted in sexual harassment cases); infra notes 
120–121 and accompanying text. 
120 John M. Singleton, Effective Strategies for Mounting a Successful Sexual Harassment Case, 
in Representing Employees in Sexual Harassment Cases: Leading Lawyers on Man-
aging Sexual Harassment Disputes and Achieving Successful Resolutions 61, 61–
62 (2012). 
121 See DeMay, supra note 18, at 56 (noting issues that arise with using social media evi-
dence in litigation); Orenstein, supra note 7, at 186 (stating that courts must determine 
how to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to social media evidence and noting judicial 
concerns about how to do so). 
122 See infra notes 125–175 and accompanying text. 
123 See infra notes 125–151 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra notes 152–175 and accompanying text 
125 See supra notes 84–118 and accompanying text (discussing admissibility of social 
media evidence generally). 
2013] Sexual Harassment and Social Media Evidence 1863 
elements.126 Further, courts still struggle to determine the appropriate 
balance of information to admit under Rule 412 when determining 
admissibility of evidence regarding the plaintiff’s appearance at work or 
the plaintiff’s past sexual conduct.127 In particular, two elements of a 
hostile work environment claim—that the conduct was unwelcome and 
that the conduct created a objectively and subjectively hostile work en-
vironment—have resulted in the admittance of a wide range of evi-
dence that should be barred by Rule 412.128 
1. It’s Complicated: How Social Media Evidence Could Limit the 
Protection Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412 Provides to Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiffs 
 Despite Rule 412’s extension to civil cases, courts still lack clear 
guidance on applying Rule 412 in civil cases because of both the Su-
preme Court’s disapproval of Rule 412’s extension to civil cases and the 
flexibility of Rule 412(b)’s balancing test.129 First, the Supreme Court 
seemed to support admission of evidence of plaintiffs’ sexual activities 
in its 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, where the court 
concluded that courts could properly consider a plaintiff’s speech and 
appearance when it is relevant to the defense of a sexual harassment 
claim.130 Further, prior to the extension of Rule 412 to civil cases, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, who had written for the Court in Meritor, 
expressed serious concern to the Rules Advisory Committee that ex-
tending Rule 412 to civil suits would unduly infringe upon defendants’ 
ability to introduce evidence that the Court had explicitly allowed in 
                                                                                                                      
126 Curcio, supra note 3, at 129–30, 139 (stating that the elements of a hostile work en-
vironment claim dictate what evidence will be admissible); Keller & Tracy, supra note 48, at 
250 (stating that plaintiffs’ failure to win sexual harassment cases is a result of misapplica-
tion of substantive law standards by lower courts); see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986) (establishing the elements of a hostile work environment claim). 
127 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 139 (describing courts’ struggle to determine what evi-
dence Rule 412 should exclude). 
128 Id. at 126, 131–33. 
129 See Beiner, supra note 4, at 129 (stating issues with the flexibility of Rule 412(b)’s 
balancing test); Curcio, supra note 3, at 131–32 (describing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Meritor and its support for allowing admission of evidence of the plaintiff’s appearance 
and conduct). 
130 See 477 U.S. at 68–69; Curcio, supra note 3, at 131. 
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Meritor.131 Other justices shared Justice Rehnquist’s concerns so much 
so that the Court refused to forward the proposed rule to Congress.132 
 Second, Rule 412(b) currently provides flexibility for defendants 
to introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual behavior and relation-
ships.133 Because courts have almost universally found concerns about 
the plaintiff’s privacy moot in the context of social media evidence, the 
Rule 412(b) balancing test usually favors defendants who introduce 
such evidence.134 Courts agree that information posted freely by plain-
tiffs on social media sites is not protected in the same way as something 
said in the privacy of a home.135 
 Diminished privacy concerns matter because social media content 
provides a great deal of irrelevant information about a plaintiff’s ap-
pearance, sexual relationships, and otherwise private interactions.136 For 
example, a Facebook profile may document the user’s romantic rela-
tionship status and could track changes in that relationship.137 Facebook 
profile pictures—which are almost always publically viewable—most of-
                                                                                                                      
131 Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to John F. Gerry (Apr. 29, 1994), in 
H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, at V–VI (1994); Beiner, supra note 4, at 131; Curcio, supra note 3, 
at 137; see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68–69. 
132 Curcio, supra note 3, at 137. Although Congress still enacted the extension, the Su-
preme Court has yet to explicitly utilize Rule 412 to limit evidence from discovery or ad-
mission in a sexual harassment case. See Beiner, supra note 4, at 130–31. 
133 Fed. R. Evid. 412(b); see Beiner, supra note 4, at 129. 
134 See Browning, supra note 13, at 494 (citing a magistrate judge stating that “one 
does not venture onto a social networking site to engage in a soliloquy”); see, e.g., E.E.O.C. 
v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at 
*1 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (“As a general matter, I view [social media] content logically as 
though each class member had a file folder titled ‘Everything About Me,’ which they have 
voluntarily shared with others.”); E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 
434 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (“[A] person’s expectation and intent that her communications be 
maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding those communications from 
discovery. . . . [M]erely locking a profile from public access does not prevent discovery 
. . . .”); Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656. (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“Indeed, as nei-
ther Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy, Plaintiff has no legitimate rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”). 
135 See, e.g., Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *1 (stating that the plaintiff’s social 
media profile was essentially an “Everything About Me” folder to which the defendant 
might need access); Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 434 (noting that marking information as 
private on a social media site does not create a right to privacy); Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 
655 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment constitutional right to privacy protects peo-
ple, but not places like a social media site). 
136 See Bianca Boster, What Facebook Knows About Our Break-ups and Romances, Huffington 
Post, Mar. 23, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/facebook- 
break-ups-relationships_n_1375822.html (explaining that Facebook relationship statuses 
provide insight into the user’s dating habits and other behavior). 
137 Id. 
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ten depict users as attractive, and interested in romantic relationships.138 
Consequently, the combination of courts’ limited privacy concerns for 
social media evidence and Rule 412(b)’s flexibility could provide fact-
finders with increased access to misleading social media evidence of the 
plaintiff’s personal life that could essentially override the protections 
Congress sought with the extension of Rule 412.139 
 Presenting a more abstract barrier, the courts’ lack of familiarity 
with social media sites and the changing social norms regarding their 
use exacerbate the problem of gender bias in admissibility decisions.140 
The desire to create a likable online persona results in users posting 
pictures of themselves that conform to society’s notions of attractive-
ness or showing themselves as more extraverted than they actually 
are.141 Though current case law has not yet addressed this scenario di-
rectly, a picture posted on a social media site of a plaintiff socializing 
with male co-workers in which she appears flirtatious or outgoing could 
undermine her claims that sexual advances from a supervisor were un-
welcome.142 Similarly, a picture of the plaintiff in a revealing dress— 
likely chosen to highlight her physical appearance—could lead the jury 
to believe she may have encouraged the alleged sexual advances.143 
                                                                                                                      
 
138 See Brown, supra note 55, at 365 (noting a 2008 study that revealed that Facebook 
profile pictures are most often chosen to depict the user as attractive, fun-loving, humor-
ous, or in a successful romantic relationship). On Facebook, a user’s profile picture is pub-
lic by default. Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
help/193629617349922/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); see also Fung, supra note 2 (stating 
that a thumbnail of the user’s Facebook profile picture can be viewed by the general pub-
lic on Google and other Internet search engines). 
139 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 139 (explaining how the balancing test embodied in 
Rule 412(b) results in inconsistent protections for sexual harassment plaintiffs); see, e.g., 
Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3 (allowing broad social media discovery despite 
Rule 412). 
140 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 157–66 (discussing gender bias and various stereotypes 
about women that play an explicit or implicit role in sexual harassment cases and their 
impact); Brown, supra note 55, at 381–82 (noting courts’ failure to understand the com-
plexities of social motives for putting certain content on social media). Although the ex-
tension of Rule 412 to civil cases helped judges recognize when traditional forms of evi-
dence containing information about the plaintiff’s sexual activity were prejudicial or 
irrelevant, a judge’s lack of familiarity with social media evidence could lead the judge to 
admit such information. See infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
141 See Brown, supra note 55, at 364–65 (explaining how social media sites can portray 
an idealized version of the user). 
142 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 166–67 (explaining how evidence of a plaintiff’s conduct 
with co-workers could be used to show that the plaintiff welcomed the conduct from the 
alleged harasser). 
143 See Brown, supra note 55, at 365 (explaining that a 2009 study highlighted the sig-
nificance of physical appearance in a typical social media user’s self-presentation, conclud-
ing that people most often “untag” a photograph because of dissatisfaction with how they 
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2. Everything Looks Better on Facebook: Why Social Media Evidence 
Provides Inaccurate Information About Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs 
 In addition to content implicated by Rule 412, social media’s lim-
ited ability to accurately reveal a plaintiff’s mental state or her genuine 
social interactions will hurt sexual harassment plaintiffs who seek dam-
ages for emotional harm.144 In 1994, Congress amended Title VII to 
allow compensation for emotional harm caused by sexual harass-
ment.145 When a plaintiff seeks such damages, however, she places her 
psychological history into controversy and is thus vulnerable to the ad-
mission of any evidence that implies something other than the alleged 
harassment caused the plaintiff’s emotional harm.146 Accordingly, de-
fendants may seek admission of social media evidence to prove a sexual 
harassment plaintiff enjoyed her work, got along with her colleagues, 
or was depressed for reasons other than the alleged harassment.147 
 Social media evidence, however, is particularly unreliable for prov-
ing a plaintiff’s emotional state because users often project happiness 
on social media even when they are dealing with emotional distress.148 
As one commentator explained, social media users engage in a “game 
where [they] try to see who can fabricate the most believable lie in a 
competition to see who has the best life.”149 Nevertheless, courts in a 
variety of civil suits have admitted social media evidence as a convincing 
“snapshot of the user’s relationships and state of mind at the time of 
the content’s posting.”150 Until courts recognize the limitations of so-
                                                                                                                      
 
look in it); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68–69 (stating that the plaintiff’s appearance is rele-
vant in a sexual harassment case). 
144 See Brown, supra note 55, at 364–67 (discussing various ways in which social media 
evidence presents an inaccurate view of the user and why it does so). 
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (allowing sexual harassment plaintiffs to recover 
damages for emotional harm); Curcio, supra note 3, at 149 (describing the amendment of 
Title VII to allow recovery for emotional damages and its role in sexual harassment cases). 
146 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 149. 
147 See, e.g., Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *1–2 (stating that the defendant 
sought social media evidence to examine the causes of the plaintiffs’ emotional harm oth-
er than the alleged harassment); Simply Storage, 470 F.R.D. at 435 (noting that social media 
evidence showing that other stressors could have caused the emotional harm is relevant 
and discoverable). 
148 Brown, supra note 55, at 364–65, 380–82. 
149 Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Nathan Batson, The Facebook 
You, Comical Concept, http://www.comicalconcept.com/illustrations/the-facebook-you 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
150 See Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 ( JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1–2 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (requiring further production of information from the plaintiff’s 
Facebook account because each “snapshot” could provide relevant information); Brown, 
supra note 55, at 380 (discussing the proper use of social media evidence in personal injury 
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cial media, such evidence will continue to be afforded more weight 
than it deserves, thereby undermining plaintiffs’ claims of emotional 
harm in sexual harassment cases.151 
                                                                                                                     
B. It Has Always Been Broken: How the Inclusion of Social Media Evidence 
Highlights the Existing Vulnerability of Sexual Harassment  
Plaintiffs During Discovery 
 Given the relevancy of social media evidence, its broad discoverabil-
ity, and a history of courts misapplying or ignoring Rule 412 in sexual 
harassment cases, social media evidence of a plaintiff’s past sexual con-
duct will likely be admitted whenever it is found discoverable.152 There-
fore, the discovery stage will play a critical role in determining the im-
pact of social media evidence on sexual harassment plaintiffs.153 This is 
particularly problematic because the discovery process has long been 
more hazardous to sexual harassment plaintiffs than to those in other 
civil suits.154 
 Chiefly, sexual harassment plaintiffs face increased dangers during 
discovery because defense counsel can intimidate plaintiffs, as Rule 412 
does not sufficiently guard against abusive, probing discovery tech-
niques.155 Consequently, if the court allows broad and invasive discov-
ery into the plaintiff’s sexual conduct prior to trial, the plaintiff can 
only chose between complying with the discovery request, or withdraw-
 
cases to show physical harm); see, e.g., State v. Altajir, 2 A.3d 1024, 1029, 1033 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2010) (admitting Facebook photographs showing the defendant socializing happily as 
evidence that the defendant did not feel remorse); Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 654 (using 
Facebook and Myspace photographs of the plaintiff outsider her home to undermine her 
claims of loss of enjoyment of life). 
151 See Brown, supra note 55, at 392–93. 
152 See id. at 392 (describing social media evidence’s increasing role in litigation); supra 
notes 90–94 and accompanying text (describing the relevancy of social media evidence); 
supra notes 59–68 and accompanying text (examining the Simply Storage decision and social 
media evidence’s broad discoverability); supra notes 125–151 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the limits of Rule 412 as applied to sexual harassment cases). 
153 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 139–40 (explaining the vulnerability of sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs at the discovery stage). 
154 See id. at 140–42 (describing problems associated with using Rule 412 to protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs during discovery). 
155 Id.; Patton, supra note 115, at 993; see Aiken, supra note 84, at 560–61. As an eviden-
tiary rule, Rule 412 adequately protects victims in criminal cases because it prevents irrele-
vant evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct from being at admitted at trial, which is the 
first time opposing counsel can inquire into the victim’s personal life. Curcio, supra note 3, 
at 140. 
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ing or settling her claim to avoid such embarrassment.156 The lack of 
protection from discovery of the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct often 
deters victims of sexual harassment from bringing a suit at all.157 The 
invasive discovery process may be as emotionally devastating for plain-
tiffs as the harassment itself.158 Therefore, sexual harassment plaintiffs 
find little comfort in the knowledge that much of the information pro-
duced during discovery will likely prove inadmissible at trial.159 
                                                                                                                     
 Additionally, despite Rule 412’s Advisory Committee’s Note that 
encourages courts to apply the principles of Rule 412 to discovery deci-
sions, several problems with the note’s language have prevented it from 
adequately protecting plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases.160 First, the 
Advisory Committee’s Note states that courts “should” —not “must” — 
presumptively enter protective orders to limit invasive and irrelevant 
inquiries into the plaintiff’s private life.161 Consequently, the permissive 
statutory language allows courts to utilize Rule 412’s limiting suggestion 
merely on a case-by-case basis, which can lead to inconsistent and unfair 
results for plaintiffs.162 
 Second, the Advisory Committee’s Note first requires plaintiffs to 
seek a protective order for Rule 412 to apply at the discovery stage at 
all.163 As a result, uninformed plaintiffs may have their private sexual 
 
156 Curcio, supra note 3, at 140–41; Richard C. Bell, Note, Shielding Parties to Title VII Ac-
tions for Sexual Harassment from the Discovery of Their Sexual History—Should Rule 412 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Be Applicable to Discovery?, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 
285, 287 (1998). 
157 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 136 (citing a survey in which 90 percent of sexual har-
assment victims reported they would not sue due to fear of retaliation and fear of loss of 
privacy). 
158 Patton, supra note 115, at 1006–07 (discussing the experience of many sexual har-
assment plaintiffs during discovery); see Bell, supra note 156, at 294 (describing a similar 
experience for rape victims who are “bullied” during the trial process). 
159 Patton, supra note 115, at 997–98. 
160 See Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note; Patton, supra note 115, at 996 (not-
ing that the Advisory Committee’s Note is not binding and therefore has limited power); 
Bell, supra note 156, at 289 (explaining problems caused by requiring plaintiffs to take 
action before Rule 412 can protect them during discovery). 
161 See Fed. R. Evid. 412(c) advisory committee’s note; Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss 
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that using “shall” in the stat-
ute “normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”). 
162 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 143 (stating that courts vary in the weight they give to 
the Advisory Committee’s suggestion to presumptively grant protective orders and in the 
way they integrate Federal Rule of Evidence 412 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26); 
Patton, supra note 115, at 996 (explaining that the Advisory Committee’s Note provides 
only suggested guidance to courts). 
163 See Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note; Aiken, supra note 84, at 567. 
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conduct on display during discovery.164 Placing this burden on plain-
tiffs makes Rule 412’s already non-binding application to discovery 
even more limited; if a plaintiff fails to move for a protective order, no 
other bar exists to prevent this evidence from the scope of discovery.165 
                                                                                                                     
 Recent rulings allowing broad discovery of social media evidence in 
sexual harassment cases indicate that social media evidence will increase 
the existing vulnerability of sexual harassment plaintiffs during discov-
ery.166 Neither the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indi-
ana’s 2010 decision in E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, nor 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado’s 2012 decision in 
E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Georgia mentioned the poten-
tial limits that Rule 412 places on discovery.167 In fact, the Honeybaked 
Ham court allowed broad discovery of social media content despite its 
explicit statement that it remained unconvinced that all of the discov-
ered information would be relevant and admissible at trial.168 These rul-
ings allowing broad discovery of social media evidence support the ar-
gument that the current law fails to prevent the increased 
embarrassment and harm sexual harassment plaintiffs could face dur-
ing discovery from the inclusion of social media evidence.169 
 Discovery of a sexual harassment plaintiff’s full Facebook profile— 
a request that has been recently approved by a court—provides a con-
crete example of this increased harm.170 At a minimum, a Facebook 
 
164 Bell, supra note 156, at 289. 
165 See Aiken, supra note 84, at 567. 
166 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *1–3 (allowing broad discovery but em-
phasizing that the court’s decision applied only to discovery by stating that the court was 
“not determining what is admissible at trial”); Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 437 (noting that 
the court’s order for production did not automatically make the social media content ad-
missible). 
167 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3; Simply Storage, 279 F.R.D. at 435–36. 
In Simply Storage, the court allowed broad discovery of the plaintiffs’ full Myspace profiles, 
including postings, messages, applications, some third-party communications, and all pho-
tographs taken or posted during the claim’s relevant time period. 279 F.R.D. at 435–36. 
Similarly, in Honeybaked Ham, the court ordered production of the plaintiffs’ full social 
media profile. 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3. 
168 Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *1, *3. 
169 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2; Simply Storage, 279 F.R.D. at 435–36; 
Curcio, supra note 3, at 139–140 (explaining the risk of exposure of embarrassing, private 
information sexual harassment plaintiffs face during discovery). 
170 See Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1–2 (ordering production of the plaintiff’s complete 
Facebook profile because the court’s review of the unproduced profile contained informa-
tion that was clearly relevant); Curcio, supra note 3, at 139–140 (explaining the risk of ex-
posure of embarrassing, private information sexual harassment plaintiffs face during dis-
covery); DeMay, supra note 18, at 56 (explaining that discovery of social media provides 
parties with access to more information than traditional forms of evidence). 
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profile provides the defendant with a profile picture and other photo-
graphs of the user, comments made by or about the plaintiff, and often 
the user’s relationship status.171 Thus, without any depositions or 
lengthy interrogatories, a simple discovery request could quickly pro-
vide the defendant with damaging images of the plaintiff and insight 
into her romantic relationships.172 The same result could arise from dis-
covery of a plaintiff’s Twitter or Myspace account.173 Therefore, social 
media evidence heightens the threat of exposure of sexual harassment 
plaintiffs’ sexual conduct because it provides such evidence faster and 
on a larger scale than traditional forms of evidence would.174 As attor-
neys show no signs of shying away from social media evidence, courts 
must create workable rules for social media evidence in sexual harass-
ment cases that allow defendants to utilize this new form of evidence 
without causing more harm to plaintiffs.175 
III. Limiting Discovery, Preventing Exposure: A Proposal for 
Limiting Social Media Evidence at the Discovery  
Stage in Sexual Harassment Cases 
 Because social media evidence harms sexual harassment plaintiffs 
at the discovery stage, protection for sexual harassment plaintiffs must 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Introducing Timeline, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/about/timeline (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2013) (providing an example of a user’s Facebook profile). 
172 See Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule aims to avoid 
discovery of the plaintiff’s sexual history in order to prevent “sexual stereotyping that 
is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual 
innuendo into the factfinding process”); DeMay, supra note 18, at 56 (stating that discov-
ery of social media provides parties with the opportunity to obtain information about 
which they might otherwise be unaware). 
173 See Browning, supra note 13, at 465 (describing an example, outside of sexual har-
assment, in which Twitter messages could be used against someone in litigation); see supra 
notes 69–77 and accompanying text (explaining a court’s approach to the discovery of 
information posted on Myspace). 
174 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 140–41 (highlighting the increased exposure during dis-
covery for sexual harassment plaintiffs and how discovery rules promote liberal produc-
tion of evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct); DeMay, supra note 18, at 56 (noting the 
additional information provided by one social media request that would not be readily 
available via traditional forms of evidence); Patton, supra note 115, at 998 (stating that 
inadmissibility at trial does not provide relief to plaintiffs during the discovery stage). 
175 See Browning, supra note 13, at 467 (discussing the widespread use of social media 
evidence by lawyers in private and public sectors and noting a 25 percent increase in usage 
in 2009); DeMay, supra note 18, at 56 (stating that social media evidence has fundamen-
tally changed how businesses run and people interact and therefore has become an inte-
gral part of litigation). 
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apply to the discovery stage as well.176 Two sexual harassment decisions 
in the last decade offered methods of limiting discovery of social media 
evidence that, if combined, will prevent irrelevant social media infor-
mation from being admitted, and will protect sexual harassment plain-
tiffs from embarrassing exposure of their private sexual conduct via 
social media evidence.177 In its 2007 decision in Mackelprang v. Fidelity 
National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada explicitly utilized Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to limit 
the discovery of social media information, thereby sending a clear sig-
nal to other courts that Rule 412’s principles can be effectively applied 
in the discovery stage of sexual harassment cases.178 In its 2012 decision 
in E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Georgia, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado limited unnecessary exposure of the 
plaintiff’s private sexual conduct and other irrelevant evidence through 
an in camera review of broadly discoverable social media content, 
thereby allowing for the removal of irrelevant evidence prior to the de-
fendant ever seeing it.179 
 Section A of this Part endorses the approaches taken by the Mac-
kelprang and Honeybaked Ham courts to limit social media evidence at 
the discovery stage.180 Section B then argues that a hybrid of the two 
courts’ approaches in handling social media evidence will best protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs.181 Finally, Section C explains that for this 
Note’s proposal to have meaningful and long-lasting effects, judges 
must be made aware of the norms embodied in social media evi-
dence.182 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 139–40 (explaining the vulnerability of sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs at the discovery stage); infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text (de-
scribing how protections at the discovery stage would benefit sexual harassment plaintiffs). 
177 See E.E.O.C. v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 
2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (ordering an in camera review of social 
media evidence); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., 2:06-cv-00788-
JCM, 2007 WL 119149, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (specifically discussing Rule 412 in re-
gard to discovery of social media evidence); infra notes 183–217 and accompanying text. 
178 See 2007 WL 119149, at *6; infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. 
179 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3; see infra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
180 See infra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 201–221 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 222–229 and accompanying text. 
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A. Moving in the Right Direction: The Benefits of the Mackelprang and 
Honeybaked Ham Decisions 
 Given the courts’ acceptance of social media evidence and its dom-
inance in modern social interactions, it is impractical and inappropri-
ate for courts to bar discovery of social media evidence in sexual har-
assment cases entirely.183 Social media users can send messages, update 
their statuses, and post photographs from anywhere in the world, in-
cluding their workplace.184 Consequently, supervisors and employees 
may have interactions on social media, and it would be unfair to both 
parties to exclude these communications from sexual harassment cas-
es.185 Moreover, in cases of long-term harassment, social media could 
document the duration of the harassment, therefore benefitting the 
plaintiff.186 Accordingly, rather than eliminating social media evidence 
from sexual harassment cases altogether, courts should seek to limit this 
evidence during discovery.187 
 The two significant problems that social media evidence presents 
for sexual harassment plaintiffs—the inclusion of irrelevant information 
and the exposure of the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct—were ad-
dressed by the Mackelprang and Honeybaked Ham courts, respectively.188 
                                                                                                                      
183 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435 (S.D. Ind. 
2010) (allowing broad discovery of social media beyond content that directly references 
the matters alleged in the complaint); infra notes 184–186 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining why a complete bar to social media evidence would be inappropriate). 
184 See The Social Media Report, supra note 9, at 1 (stating that social media users 
have the freedom to connect wherever they want); Lane, supra note 20, at 2 (describing 
how employees are constantly connected to their workplace via mobile phones and com-
puters). 
185 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 177 (describing defendants’ arguments that restrictions 
on discovery would unfairly limit their ability to bring a full defense); Jeremy Gelms, 
Comment, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for Employee Social Media 
Misconduct, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 249, 249–50 (2012) (explaining that social media provides 
additional ways for colleagues to interact and that the court may consider information 
posted on social media sites as part of the totality of the circumstances in certain cases). 
186 See Singleton, supra note 120, at 66 (noting the importance of documenting the in-
cidences of harassment). 
187 See Gensler, supra note 12, at 12–13 (introducing the idea that judicial action is the 
best way to resolve any discovery issues with social media evidence); infra notes 189–221 
and accompanying text (describing the Mackelprang and Honeybaked Ham decisions and 
why courts should follow a combination of the approaches taken to discovery in these two 
cases). 
188 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at 
*6; infra notes 189–200 and accompanying text. 
2013] Sexual Harassment and Social Media Evidence 1873 
1. Utilizing the Mackelprang Method: Applying the Limiting Principles 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 During Discovery to Prevent 
Exposure of Private Sexual Conduct 
 The Mackelprang court established a clear limit on the scope of dis-
coverable social media evidence by explicitly applying Rule 412’s prin-
ciples at the discovery stage.189 The court’s action achieved two impor-
tant goals.190 First, though still respecting that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 governs discovery, the court utilized the principles of 
Rule 412 to remove irrelevant information at the discovery stage to 
prevent the embarrassment that would likely result from one’s private 
sexual conduct being exposed to the defendant.191 
 Second, the explicit application of Rule 412’s tenets to discovery of 
social media evidence provides a clear, understandable precedent that 
other courts can easily apply in their own cases.192 By explicitly stating 
its consideration of Rule 412, the Mackelprang court’s approach pre-
vents potential confusion by other courts about the use of Rule 412 
when limiting discovery, a confusion inherent in less explicit applica-
tions of Rule 412 in sexual harassment cases.193 Consequently, courts 
that agree that Rule 412 should play a role in discovery can rely on 
Mackelprang to determine the scope of Rule 412 and how to adequately 
balance it with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.194 Thus, to protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs, courts should include an explicit applica-
tion of Rule 412’s principles.195 
                                                                                                                      
189 2007 WL 119149, at *3–4; see Gensler, supra note 12, at 15 (noting how the Mackel-
prang court limited the scope of discovery of social media evidence). Though acknowledg-
ing the liberal discovery standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the Mackelprang 
court refused to allow discovery of the plaintiff’s Myspace messages about her private sex-
ual activities with third parties. 2007 WL 119149, at *4–6. 
190 See infra notes 191–195 and accompanying text. 
191 See Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *4–6. 
192 See Browning, supra note 13, at 474 (stating that the Mackelprang decision is particu-
larly helpful to courts determining the discovery of social media evidence). But see Beiner, 
supra note 4, at 132 (explaining how a lack of discussion of Rule 412 in Mackelprang makes 
it difficult for other courts to follow the decision). 
193 See Beiner, supra note 4, at 131–32 (explaining that when courts do not mention 
Rule 412, it is difficult to determine whether the court applied Rule 412 in sexual harass-
ment cases in which evidence of sexy dressing was admitted or excluded). 
194 See Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *3–4; Bell, supra note 156, at 288 (noting that 
the Advisory Committee’s Note makes it clear that Rule 412 has a role in the discovery 
process but that the exact nature of that role remains unclear); cf. Patton, supra note 115, 
at 992 (explaining how bright-line rules benefit courts and plaintiffs). 
195 See supra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. 
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2. The Honeybaked Ham Approach: Using an “In Camera” Review to 
Limit Discovery of Irrelevant Social Media Evidence 
 The Honeybaked Ham court provided additional security to sexual 
harassment plaintiffs by performing an in camera review of social me-
dia evidence during discovery.196 Although Rule 412(c) already re-
quires an in camera review to determine the admissibility of evidence, 
performing the review in the discovery phase will: (1) provide added 
protection to the plaintiff by alleviating concerns about public embar-
rassment that might prevent a sexual harassment plaintiff from coming 
forward; and (2) more effectively prevent the defendant from receiving 
irrelevant information about the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct, non-
work related socializing, or any other irrelevant evidence via broad so-
cial media discovery.197 Further, the process does not prevent a defen-
dant from gathering relevant evidence to prove his case because it 
merely allows the judge to eliminate evidence that ultimately will be 
inadmissible.198 The in camera review also benefits defendants because 
it allows a judge to order further discovery if he or she believes the orig-
inal production was inadequate.199 
 Additionally, utilizing an in camera review for social media evi-
dence may allow attorneys to present research about social media’s in-
ability to accurately portray the user’s emotional state, thus reducing 
the risk of judges giving excessive value to social media content.200 
B. Two Is Better Than One: A Proposed Solution Provided by Combining the 
Mackelprang and Honeybaked Ham Approaches 
 Though each approach has its benefits, the Mackelprang and Hon-
eybaked Ham approaches better serve sexual harassment plaintiffs as 
complementary methods for limiting discovery of social media evi-
dence in sexual harassment cases.201 Combining the two approaches 
                                                                                                                      
196 See 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3. 
197 See Fed. R. Evid. 412(c); Bell, supra note 156, at 298–99; Brown, supra note 55, at 
387 (suggesting that courts should use in camera review to extract relevant information 
from the mass of irrelevant information provided on Facebook); supra notes 155–159, 170–
175 and accompanying text (explaining why sexual harassment plaintiffs fear exposure 
and embarrassment at the discovery stage). 
198 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3 (allowing discovery of all informa-
tion relevant to the defense). 
199 See Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 ( JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1–2 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (ordering additional discovery because the plaintiff’s original pro-
duction inadequately responded to the defendant’s request). 
200 See Brown, supra note 55, at 387–88. 
201 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *3–4. 
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will best eliminate irrelevant evidence, protect sexual harassment plain-
tiffs, and provide a clear rule for other courts to follow.202 Explicitly ap-
plying Rule 412’s limiting principles prior to an in camera review of 
social media evidence creates a discovery method that limits produc-
tion of irrelevant social media evidence, lessens plaintiffs’ concerns 
about exposure of their private sexual behavior without unduly burden-
ing courts, and provides guidance to other courts on how to review so-
cial media evidence.203 
 First, combining an in camera review with an explicit discussion of 
Rule 412 provides more security to sexual harassment plaintiffs’ private 
sexual conduct than either approach can provide on its own.204 Making 
an explicit reference to the balancing of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 shows plaintiffs that the court 
understands its obligation to balance the goals of the two rules and that 
it will not allow defendants to circumvent the limits of Rule 412.205 Fur-
ther, the explicit reference allows plaintiffs to protect themselves from 
invasive discovery requests by citing a specific legal principle or refer-
ring to case law where the court explicitly applied Rule 412’s principles 
to social media discovery.206 Performing an in camera review of social 
media evidence alone would not provide plaintiffs with such an acces-
sible tool.207 
 Equally important, limiting discovery with Rule 412’s principles 
reduces the amount of information produced for judges to review in 
                                                                                                                      
202 See infra notes 203–217 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits for sexual 
harassment plaintiffs of combining the two approaches). 
203 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3; Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at 
*3–4; Beiner, supra note 4, at 131–32; Bell, supra note 156, at 288; Brown, supra note 55, at 
387; infra notes 204–217 and accompanying text. 
204 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 175 (suggesting a more restrictive discovery rule because 
Rule 412 currently requires women “to expose intimate personal details of their lives in 
order to take advantage of a legal remedy [which] makes the remedy come at so great a 
cost that many victims may choose not to pursue it”); Patton, supra note 115, at 997–98 
(stating that sexual harassment plaintiffs are more likely to bring meritorious claims if 
judges apply the principles of Rule 412 to the discovery process). 
205 Patton, supra note 115, at 998 (indicating that judges must show their awareness of 
the policy balance between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 when determining the scope of discovery to give clear signals to both plaintiffs 
and defendants that they have applied both rules). 
206 See id. at 996 (noting that some sexual harassment plaintiffs have successfully con-
vinced courts to apply Rule 412 and that doing so protected the plaintiffs’ privacy and 
prevented potential stress and intimidation during discovery). 
207 See Brown, supra note 55, at 387 (stating that an in camera review may be requested 
by a plaintiff but the court may be hesitant to allow it due to the burden it places on judi-
cial resources). 
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camera and, consequently, alleviates the burden on judicial resources 
that an in camera review could cause.208 An in camera review alone 
places a burden on the court to sift through the tonnage of social me-
dia evidence produced.209 Without another limiting action prior to in 
camera review to guide them, courts are unlikely to adopt an in camera 
review as a tool in cases involving multiple plaintiffs or years of social 
media content.210 
 Further, judges without much exposure to social media may doubt 
their ability to critically and efficiently examine social media evidence, 
especially at such an early stage in litigation.211 Applying Rule 412’s 
principles to the in camera review process will specify what type of in-
formation judges must exclude as irrelevant, thereby simplifying the 
process for judges and encouraging more consistent results across 
courts.212 
 Compatibly, an in camera review helps courts apply Rule 412 at the 
discovery stage.213 Because the facts and issues of a specific case have 
not been fully developed at the discovery stage and the court has not 
                                                                                                                      
208 See infra notes 209–212 and accompanying text (describing the judicial burden an 
in camera review may impose). 
209 Brown, supra note 55, at 388 (noting that an in camera review requires significant 
judicial resources). 
210 See Gensler, supra note 12, at 26 (stating that courts do not want to take on the im-
practical task of sifting through discovery production unguided); Brown, supra note 55, at 
388. 
211 See Brown, supra note 55, at 388 (discussing one judge’s doubts about his ability to 
accurately determine which social media evidence would be relevant during an in camera 
review). 
212 See Fed. R. Evid. 412; cf. Brown, supra note 55, at 387–88 (stating concern that an in 
camera review at the discovery stage might lead to “guess[ing] as to what is germane to 
defenses which may be raised at trial” (quoting Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-
1535, 2011 WL 2065410, at *1 n.2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 19, 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). Though the in camera review in Honeybaked Ham limited the defen-
dant’s access to evidence of the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct, the court did not ex-
pressly identify such evidence as irrelevant. See 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3. In fact, the court 
acknowledged that evidence of the plaintiff’s comfort with offensive sexual comments and 
her sexually promiscuous conduct was potentially relevant. See id. at *2 (identifying evi-
dence from Facebook of the plaintiff “wearing a shirt with the word ‘cunt’ in large letters 
written across the front (a term that she alleges was used pejoratively against her, also alleg-
ing that such use offended her) . . . her self-described sexual aggressiveness . . . [and] sex-
ually amorous communications with other class members” as “potentially relevant”). 
Therefore, after Honeybaked Ham, both sexual harassment plaintiffs and courts deciding 
their cases may remain unsure about the effective exclusion of evidence of private sexual 
conduct. See Beiner, supra note 4, at 131–32 (explaining that it is difficult to determine 
whether the courts have applied Rule 412 in sexual harassment cases in which evidence of 
sexy dressing was admitted or excluded because many courts have not mentioned Rule 412 
in their decision). 
213 See infra notes 214–215 and accompanying text. 
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yet seen the evidence sought, it is difficult for a judge to determine 
what evidence may be potentially relevant and how the evidence fits 
into the Rule 412 balancing test.214 An in camera review allows courts to 
see such evidence and to make an informed decision, guided by the 
principles of Rule 412.215 
 Finally, because Rule 412 only prohibits the admission of evidence 
of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct, an in camera review is necessary to 
fully relieve plaintiffs’ concerns that defendants will have access to pri-
vate and potentially embarrassing information.216 Because social media 
content often contains both relevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence, 
reviewing social media evidence in camera will be particularly helpful 
to eliminate social media evidence that is irrelevant for reasons beyond 
those contained in Rule 412.217 
 Consistently using this Note’s proposed judicial approach will less-
en the need for some of the more drastic changes suggested to protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs, such as amending Rule 412 or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.218 The Supreme Court’s hesitation about ex-
tending Rule 412 to civil cases indicates the Court’s disapproval of 
changes to the Rules of Evidence that might unduly burden defendants 
by overly restricting the use of certain sources of evidence.219 Further, 
the agreement among most academics and practitioners that the tradi-
                                                                                                                      
214 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 143. 
215 See id.; see supra notes 204–214 and accompanying text. 
216 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 175 (explaining that women may choose not to pursue a 
sexual harassment claim if they fear exposure of their private sexual conduct); Brown, 
supra note 55, at 392 (describing how in camera review allows courts to focus only on rele-
vant evidence). 
217 See Honeybaked Ham, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2–3 (allowing the plaintiff to object to 
the relevancy of evidence produced during the in camera review or to claim that certain 
information was privileged); Brown, supra note 55, at 371–72 (describing how courts have 
already used an in camera review to determine the relevancy of social media evidence in 
different types of cases); id. at 386–87 (advocating for using an in camera review of Face-
book evidence as an effective means of limiting irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial Facebook 
content). 
218 See Aiken, supra note 84, at 582 (proposing an amended Rule 412 that explicitly 
identifies when evidence of sexual conduct might be relevant); Bell, supra note 156, at 342 
(suggesting an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to protect sexual har-
assment plaintiffs rather than relying on Rule 412); but see Gensler, supra note 12, at 9–10 
(stating why amending the Rules of Civil Procedure to accommodate social media evi-
dence is an unrealistic solution and explaining that existing judicial action sufficiently 
accommodates discovery of social media evidence). 
219 See Aiken, supra note 84, at 570 (noting that the Supreme Court’s resistance to ex-
tending Rule 412 to civil cases indicates the Court’s intent to purposefully limit the rule); 
supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s resistance to 
the extension of Rule 412). 
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tional rules of discovery and admissibility apply to social media evidence 
undermines the argument that an amended procedural rule is a rea-
sonable solution.220 Therefore, the courts’ consistent willingness to per-
form an in camera review of social media evidence and to apply Rule 
412’s principles at the discovery stage provides the most comprehensive 
and practical protection for sexual harassment plaintiffs.221 
C. Embracing Social Media: The Necessity of Exposure and Awareness  
for Effective Change 
 Notably, the effectiveness of this proposal relies on judges gaining 
exposure to social media and improving their understanding of the 
complex social norms embodied in social media content.222 Because 
Rule 412 requires judges to subjectively balance the probative value of 
the evidence against the danger of harm to the plaintiff, the judge’s 
personal values, social stereotypes of others, and unconscious biases 
inevitably affect his judgments in any given situation.223 To truly protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs in modern society, judges must first scruti-
nize themselves to identify their preconceptions about individuals who 
share provocative images or statements on social media sites in order to 
fairly evaluate the probative value of social media evidence.224 
 Judges must also recognize their lack of appreciation for the com-
plex social norms embedded in social media sites.225 Social science 
studies on the nuances of social media and how others interpret it 
                                                                                                                      
220 See e.g., Boggs & Edwards, supra note 13, at 367 (discussing how discovery and ad-
missibility decisions will be made regarding social media evidence); Gensler, supra note 12, 
at 31–33, 36 (explaining the virtual impossibility of promulgating effective discovery rules 
specifically for social media); Morales, supra note 5, at 43 (determining that traditional 
evidentiary principles can be adapted for social media evidence). 
221 See supra notes 201–220 and accompanying text. 
222 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 181–82; Brown, supra note 55, at 381. 
223 See Patton, supra note 115, at 995. These stereotypes may include: assuming the 
plaintiff caused or initiated the sexual conduct; that women assume the risk of harassment 
by dressing or behaving in a certain way; and that women are responsible for not prevent-
ing sexual conduct from going too far. Aiken, supra note, 84, at 570–71. These ideas stem 
from traditional notions of gender roles and are widely held by both men and women. Id. 
Subconsciously, judges may rely on these notions to determine why some women are vic-
timized and others are not. See id. 
224 See Aiken, supra note 84, at 570–71 (explaining that judges cannot properly deter-
mine the probative value of evidence of sexual misconduct); Curcio, supra note 3, at 181 
(noting that the first step to educating oneself about gender bias is recognizing that the 
problem exists); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 79 (1987) (sug-
gesting that judges apply “strict scrutiny to [them]selves” to overcome issues of bias). 
225 See Brown, supra note 55, at 392 (stating that to ensure fairness in cases involving so-
cial media evidence, courts must evaluate the evidence within the context of social norms). 
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could help judges to better understand the probative value of this evi-
dence.226 Judges should also consider the research about the limited 
value of social media content when evaluating emotional harm.227 In-
creased awareness of the stereotypes and biases underlying their deci-
sions may force judges to examine discovery requests more carefully 
and potentially give greater weight to the principles of Rule 412.228 A 
fuller understanding of social media evidence will help judges to treat 
social media content appropriately.229 
Conclusion 
 Recent determinations that social media evidence is broadly dis-
coverable and generally admissible pose unique dangers to plaintiffs in 
sexual harassment cases. Sexual harassment plaintiffs have been more 
vulnerable at the discovery stage than most other civil plaintiffs, and 
social media evidence serves to increases that danger. Social media evi-
dence provides a new source of information that is less limited by pri-
vacy concerns and contains a blend of both relevant and irrelevant evi-
dence. A seemingly harmless picture posted by the plaintiff might also 
contain comments from other users describing her behavior or reveal 
aspects of her private life. 
 Social media content also fails to provide an accurate picture of 
the plaintiff’s mental state, and therefore is less reliable in a sexual har-
assment case in which it is used to prove the subjective experience of 
the harassment. Accordingly, in order to use social media evidence in 
sexual harassment cases, courts must stringently review the material 
and consider the social norms surrounding social media to determine 
its true relevancy to the case. 
 Specifically, to protect sexual harassment plaintiffs as Congress in-
tended to do with the extension of Rule 412 to civil cases, courts must 
practice a consistent method for evaluating the discovery of social me-
dia evidence and strive to improve their understanding of social media. 
Courts should explicitly apply Rule 412’s principles to discovery and 
then perform an in camera review of social media evidence to screen 
out irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. This judicial approach will not 
only alleviate the existing vulnerability of sexual harassment plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                      
226 See id. at 392–93. 
227 See Brown, supra note 55, at 381. 
228 See id. 
229 See Curcio, supra note 3, at 166 (stating that Rule 412 can best protect sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs after judges recognize the gender bias implicit in their decision making). 
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during discovery but will also prevent easily accessible, voluminous so-
cial media evidence from intensifying the problem. 
 Finally, in order for this judicial action to be meaningful, courts 
must be made aware of society’s gender biases and how those biases are 
incorporated in and exacerbated by social media. With a combination 
of continued awareness and consistent judicial action, courts can pro-
vide adequate protection for sexual harassment plaintiffs even as social 
media evidence plays an increasingly important role in civil litigation. 
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